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Abstract 
 
This paper provides evidence on the effectiveness of R&D incentives to private firms allocated 
by Region Umbria in the period between 2004 and 2009. The methodological innovation 
proposed in this paper is a novel spatial Difference-in-Difference estimator. Our approach 
compares distinct treatment effects on the basis of the localization in the main local market 
areas of Umbria (Perugia and Terni), controlling for the presence of technological spillovers 
due to geographical and economic proximity. The results show a positive and statistically 
significant impact of the subsidies, especially for innovative outputs and for small firms. The 
impact is higher for the firms located in less concentrated areas, suggesting the presence of 
significant local technological and economical spillovers due to the conjunct action of regional 
policies and spatial diffusion of the activities. Finally, this paper provides some empirical 
evidence in favour of the effectiveness of “place-based” innovation policies which constitutes 
the “core" of the recent smart specialization strategy. 
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1 Introduction 
In recent years, regional R&D policies cover an increasingly relevant role in stimulating 
innovation. Moreover, EU strategy aims to foster a “smart, sustainable and inclusive growth” 
in the less developed areas by means of innovation policies oriented to the identification and 
development of areas of specialization. The scope is to promote growth in areas characterized 
by comparative advantages and the formation of network externalities (Foray et al., 2011). 
The strengthening of regional policies as tools to enhance innovation and growth has a twofold 
justification. A stream of literature highlights how “place-based” policies, supported by 
institutional reforms and well-informed local governments, stimulate the commitment of the 
stakeholders, i.e. firms, research centres, universities and local authorities, with beneficial 
effects on local development and, potentially, on the entire economic system (Barca 2009; 
OECD 2009b; Garcilazo and Oliveira Martins 2015; Kempton 2015). Crescenzi and Rodríguez-
Pose (2011) propose a conceptual framework to justify “place-based” policies as a vehicle for 
local development and instrument of coordination among different type of policies both at 
national and regional level. Furthermore, “place-based” policies are usually implemented in 
favour of lagging areas to stimulate labour market participation and skills. This may provide a 
stimulus to local development and may increase the degree of connectivity between developed 
areas and peripheral regions in order to maximize knowledge spillovers and, in wider terms, 
innovation1 (OECD 2009a). Interestingly, place-based policies may foster spillovers formation 
not only on the basis of geographical space. On this point, Dechezleprêtre et al (2016) 
demonstrate the occurrence of technological spillovers by considering sectoral distance, i.e. 
unaffected firms operating on the same sector of the treated ones improves their number of 
patents. Overall, ”place-based” policies tend to emphasize the role played by public 
administrations; their intervention includes the provision of the incentives, the identification of 
the locations where regions have a comparative advantage and the recognition of the presence 
of investments in backward areas (Foray 2009). 
In this paper we evaluate the effects of a broad range R&D regional policy in Umbria, a small 
region located in Central Italy. We develop a ”place-based” approach by the identification of 
areas of specialization in order to assess the ”additional” impact of public policies promoting 
R&D activities of the firms. Our approach focuses on the creation of spillovers due to the 
relative proximity of the firms, considering both the geographical and the sectoral proximity. 
We restrict the analysis only to the effects of regional policies, controlling for the presence of 
any national and EU incentives The most relevant Italian empirical literature on R&D subsidies 
provides contradictory indications: the positive impact of the incentives is suggested by some 
evaluation studies, in particular with a greater efficacy limited to the SMEs (Merito, 
 
1 Neumark and Simpson (2015) propose a summary on the potential benefits of place-based policies, i.e. 
agglomeration and network effects, equity, industrial clusters. However, they remark how literature does not 
provide evidences in favour of the major efficiency of place-based policies if compared with broader incentives. 
Giannangeli, and Bonaccorsi 2007; Bronzini et al. 2008), while many others show no 
additionality (Accetturo and Blasio 2008; De Blasio, Fantino, and Pellegrini 2015; Andini and 
De Blasio 2014, Mariani and Mealli 2018). Sometimes additionality is attributed to a process 
of inter-temporal substitution that leads companies to anticipate investment in R&D (Bronzini 
and Blasio 2006). 
Despite the wide and heterogeneous literature on empirical analyses at national scale2, works 
focused on the evaluation of regional innovation policies are still scarce. Gabriele et al. (2007) 
and Corsino et al. (2012), analysing the case of Trentino-South Tirol, underline an increment 
on the stock of capital with beneficial effects on the access to new market opportunity without 
consequences on factor productivity and profitability. Fantino and Cannone (2014) provide 
evidence on the effectiveness of policies as instruments to foster short term investments, 
especially for the smallest firms and the ones with a low credit rating. Bronzini and Iachini 
(2014), examining R&D incentives in Emilia-Romagna, show positive effects of the policies 
limited to the investments of small enterprises. Similar results are obtained by Bronzini and 
Piselli (2016) which demonstrate a significant and positive impact on the number of patents of 
small firms. Bertramino et al. (2017), studying the case of Italian Technological Districts, 
underline how firms performing better, both in terms of profitability and innovativeness, are 
more likely to join the districts, while be part of the same do not affect positively performances. 
The main innovations of this work concern two particular aspects related to the methodological 
approach and the dataset used. The first novelty consists in the evaluation of the global effect 
of the policies, by identifying the occurrence of spillover effects. Therefore, we develop a 
”novel” approach that allow for differentiated interactions between the firms on the basis of 
their geographical localization and market concentration. 
The second crucial point introduced in this work relies on the availability of Community 
Innovation Survey (from now, CIS) micro-data3. Despite the relevant amount of information 
 
2 For further information on evaluation studies at national scale see the surveys in David, Hall, and Toole (2000), 
Hall and Van Reenen (2000), Cerulli (2010) and Zúñiga-Vicente et al. (2014). 
3 The Community Innovation Survey (CIS) are carried out with two years’ frequency by EU member states and 
number of ESS member countries. The CIS is a survey of innovation activity in enterprises. The harmonized survey 
is designed to provide information on the innovativeness of sectors by type of enterprises, on the different types 
of innovation and on various aspects of the development of an innovation, such as the objectives, the sources of 
information, the public funding, the innovation expenditures, etc. The CIS provides statistics broken down by type 
of innovators, economic activities and size classes (Eurostat). 
included in the CIS and the comparability with results of studies involving other European 
countries, only a limited number of works utilize this data to evaluate the effects of public 
policies (Cefis and Evangelista 2007; Cerulli and Potì 2012; Marzucchi and Montresor 2013; 
Becker and Bizer 2015). The innovation introduced in this paper consists in merging the micro-
data of the CIS with balance sheet data and a questionnaire administered by the Regional Public 
Administration of Umbria. In this way we obtain complete and detailed information on 
technological structure, R&D process, economic and financial situation of the firms. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The second section proposes a detailed 
analysis of the data, including a description of the characteristics of the policies and the firms 
considered; the third section introduces the proposed methodological framework with a focus 
on the distinction between traditional and our novel approach. In the fourth section we present 
the results of the estimates, whereas the last section is devoted to test the validity of the common 
trend assumption in order to confer robustness to our results. The conclusions and the policy 
implications are at the end of the paper. 
2 Data Analysis 
Labour Market Areas 
This paper focuses on the evaluation of place-based policies in Umbria, a small region located 
in Central Italy. Considering the limited geographical dimension of the region, we are not able 
individuate the “better-performing” areas on the basis of the traditional administrative division 
of the territory, like municipalities or provinces. In this sense, the identification of more 
developed local areas requires the preliminary determination of an alternative subdivision of 
regional territory to take into account the presence of relevant demographic and economic 
agglomeration. For this reason, the territorial grid that best suits the purposes of this study is 
based on the Labour Market Areas4 (from now LMAs). Umbria Region is composed by 14 
LMAs, many of which characterized by a reduced size, both geographical and economical, that 
does not allow to fully grasp the presence of externalities.  
 
4 Labour market areas (LMAs, “local labour systems” or Sistemi Locali del Lavoro) are sub-regional geographical 
areas where the bulk of the labour force lives and works. They respond to the need for meaningfully comparable 
sub-regional labour market areas for the reporting and analysis of statistics. LMAs are defined on a functional 
basis, the key criterion being the proportion of commuters who cross the LMA boundary on their way to work 
(ISTAT). An important characteristic of the LMA is that the areas are not overlapping and cover the entire region. 
Figure 1: Italian Labour Market Areas 
 
Legend: Geographical Distribution of Umbria LMA in the overall Italian context. 
Figure 1 shows the limited dimension of Umbria LMAs compared to the Italian territory. While, 
the average size of Umbria LMA is small, it emerges clearly how the presence of two main 
LMAs, i.e. the areas surrounding the city of Perugia (on the North) and Terni (on the South). 
Notwithstanding the limited average dimension of the LMAs, Table 1 confirms the evidence of 
two major areas, Perugia and Terni, where population and industrial production tend to be more 
agglomerated. In this sense, the localization in one of the main LMAs may cover a determinant 
role in the evaluation of the effectiveness of regional policies. Starting from this assumption, 
we want to analyse how industrial concentration influences R&D processes and the formation 
of technological and economical spillovers. 
  
Table 1: Demographical and Economic Characteristics of Umbria LMAs 
Denomination  Population  Employed  N. of jobs  Int. Movements  Demand     Supply  Municipals 
Assisi  57640 20698 20269 14934 0.74 0.72 4 
Cascia  6489 2029 1825 1635 0.9 0.81 4 
Castiglione  24955 8022 7073 5132 0.73 0.64 3 
Città di Castello  56075 20477 19496 16643 0.85 0.81 4 
Foligno  85262 28145 26743 22145 0.83 0.79 6 
Gualdo Tadino  31476 9689 8407 6824 0.81 0.7 6 
Gubbio  33874 11095 10038 8883 0.88 0.8 2 
Norcia  7934 2376 2426 1959 0.81 0.82 4 
Perugia  243653 87072 91796 77890 0.85 0.89 9 
Spoleto  45688 14713 15253 12470 0.82 0.85 6 
Todi  37854 11611 10527 8278 0.79 0.71 7 
Umbertide  20326 6973 7001 4980 0.71 0.71 3 
Orvieto  42983 13461 12801 11166 0.87 0.83 12 
Terni  178862 57036 55633 52020 0.94 0.91 18 
 
Source: Quality Indicator of Umbria LMAs (Istat, 2011) 
Note: Employed (Number of Jobs) indicates the number of occupied people living (working) in LMA; while 
Internal Movements represents people that lives and works in their own LMAs. Supply (demand) column 
represents the ratio between internal movements and Resident Employed (Number of Jobs). 
 
Dataset 
Since the 6th Framework Programme (FP6, 2000-2006) Umbria Region has developed a 
number of strategic actions to sustain the creation of business networks and improve their links 
with research centres. From 2004 the measures implemented by the Region encouraging 
entrepreneurial and territorial competitiveness are included in the so-called ”competitiveness 
package”. In order to assess the additionality of “place-based” policies on technological and 
economic performances of the firms, we take into account only the instruments directly 
provided by the Region. Regional measures can be distinct in three different packages: calls for 
investment in technological innovation, Law N. 598/1994; calls for integrated packages of 
benefits (Pacchetti Integrati di Agevolazioni, PIA); calls to promote the creation of stable 
networks of enterprise (Re.Sta.). Umbria, in the period between 2004 and 2009, provided over 
€120 million to the businesses split into 14 calls. Given the presence of more than one ranking 
in some calls, we have observed a total amount of 17 announcements. 
  
Table 2: Number of funded projects per announcement 
Announcement  N. projects Overall Funds R&D funds 
RESTA 2007  15 1 457 578 432 330 
RESTA RICERCA 2007  69 9 519 586 2 992 390 
RESTA INNO 2007  64 4 055 532 0 
RESTA INNO 2008  28 2 825 528 0 
RESTA RICERCA 2008  37 3 922 551 2 520 110 
RESTA MODA 2009  32 981 169 0 
RESTA RICERCA 2009  43 5 960 492 3 319 415 
PIA 2004  37 5 313 663 1 781 310 
PIA 2006  47 6 637 302 2 038 105 
PIA 2007  187 27 672 951 4 572 935 
PIA RICERCA 2008  56 10 156 096 6 478 780 
PIA INNO 2009  45 7 036 432 0 
L. 598/94 2004  32 6 701 330 6 701 330 
L. 598/94 2006  41 6 407 565 6 407 565 
L. 598/94 2007  74 10 021 750 10 021 750 
L. 598/94 2008  49 6 660 275 6 660 275 
L. 598/94 2009  59 9 088 240 9 088 240 
TOTAL  915 124418039 63014535 
 
Source: Core of Statistics and Evaluation of the investment, Regione Umbria. 
Note: This table resumes the overall financial commitment of the Region to the SMEs in order to improve their 
competitiveness, pointing out the number of funded projects for each announcements. In the last column is reported 
the incentives devoted directly to R\&D activities. 
However, firms’ involvement on public funding opportunities appears limited. Indeed, the 
analysis of participation rate of the firms (number of calls on which each firm has obtained 
funding) shows that the majority of them have participated in a single call, while few are the 
companies that have received funding on more than 3 calls. Regional aid for competitiveness 
provides support for 915 projects, of whom 476 directed to R&D activities. In this paper we 
consider only the incentives to R&D in defining the considered treatment variable. In this way, 
we isolate 253 financed firms which constitutes the factual sample. 
Table 3: Summary of public policies by objective 
 Aid for competitiveness   Aid for R&D activities   
N. Public announcement  17 14 
N. Financed Firms  575 253 
N. Financed Projects  915 476 
Total contributions  124 418 039 63 014 535 
 
Source: Core of Statistics and Evaluation of the investment, Regione Umbria 
Legend: Resume of policies implemented by Umbria between 2004 and 2009.  
On the other hand, the counterfactual sample was identified on a list of 148 companies selected 
by the method of the matching pairs5. In this way, we obtain a final dataset composed by 401 
firms. The objective of obtaining detailed information on economic and financial accounts and 
on the main characteristics of the production process, in particular those related to innovation 
and investments in R&D, requires the merging of data from different sources. 
The economic and financial accounts are considered by the balance sheet data for the years 
between 2004 and 2011 and provided by the Infocamere archives, while information on 
technological processes are extracted from the questionnaire and the micro-data of the Istat 
annual survey (i.e. CIS) on R&D. Besides, CIS data allow to identify pairs of companies 
subsidized and non-supported on the basis of their propensity to innovate. The baseline year of 
this analysis is 2005. This choice can be motivated in a twofold way. On one hand, balance 
sheet data provide a limited amount of information on firms’ economic data for 2004. On the 
other hand, the policies are mainly concentrated between 2006-2009 (90% of overall R&D 
funding).  
Table 4 highlights the different economic structure between treated and controls. The firsts 
exhibit, in average, better results on the profitability indicators (ROE and ROI). On the other 
hand, the untreated show greater values on turnovers, mean number of employees and net 
assets. To check for significant discrepancies between the two samples we implement a mean 
comparison test, that confirms, in overall, the absence of structural differences in the baseline 
period. Systematic differences are found in terms of net assets and ROI; this result, by itself, 
does not bias the estimates of the difference-in-difference, but requires additional robustness 
check to evaluate if these discrepancies can affect the validity of the “common trend” 
assumption. Moreover, to confer additional robustness to the results obtained we provide 
differentiated estimates for small firms (i.e. less than 50 workers) and the ones operating in 
 
5Our data set is based on the sample that is used by Istat to the Community Innovation Survey. The sample includes 
all the firms that are subsidized by the region and a group of not subsidized firms with comparable characteristics. 
All the larger firms are in the sample. The sample is defined and constructed by Region Umbria. The treated firms 
are all the R&D subsidized firms in Umbria in the period 2004-2007. The not treated firms are identified among 
firms located in Umbria in the same period that have the same economic characteristics of the treated ones. The 
following variables are used: number of workers, turnover, economic sectors, location, profitability. A 
stratification exact matching based of these characteristics was used. The variables were discretized if necessary, 
and for each stratum, determined by the different modalities of the selected variables, the not subsidized firms with 
the same characteristics were identified. 
manufacturing sector. In this way, we are able to consider more homogeneous samples and 
introduce the possibility of intra-sectoral technological spillovers. 
Table 4: Summary Statistics by Treatment-Economic Variables (2005) 
            
Treatment  Mean  Std. Err.  Difference in means 
Turnover  0 12 996 575.00 2 740 826 4 128 271 
1 8 868 304.00 1 752 325 [3 102 912]      
Employees  0 53.50 6.50 4.2 
1 49.30 5.80 [9.1]        
Capital assets  0 4 576 935.00 1 338 821 1 722 595 
1 2 854 341.00 554 093 [1 255 488]         
Intangible assets  0 753 746.00 470 290 464 352 
1 289 393.00 67 183 [371 326]        
Net assets  0 9 471 459.00 1 746 489 3741262*      
1 5 730 197.00 897 238 [1 778 125]          
ROE  0 0.28 0.35 -0.52 
1 0.81 0.38 [0.56]            
Ebitda  0 949 779.00 219 093 155 031 
1 794 748.00 128 246 [237 002]         
ROI  0 2.65 0.66  -2.35* 
1 5.00 0.81 [1.17]        
Added Value  0 2 435 978.00 385 156 340 545 
1 2 095 433.00 303 563 [493 224]      
Added Value per 
Employee  
0 40 635.00 3 272 -14 784 
1 55 420.00 11 745 [15 413]  
Turnover per 
Employee  
0 231 696.00 46 494 -60 602 
1 292 298.00 97 795 [131 597]  
 
Legend: ''Difference in Means'' reports the difference between the average of control and treatment group, while 
standard errors are in square bracket. The level of statistical significance of the mean comparison test is indicated 
with: * 0,05  
 
While treated and control groups do not present significant differences in terms of economic 
performances, a further analysis on technological and R&D variables is required. Indeed, 
defining the state of treatment on the basis of having received, or not, R&D subsidies may 
induce a different propensity on innovation and R&D activities between the two groups. Table 
5, by comparing treated and not treated firms, shows how, on average, receiving R&D subsidies 
increase technological-related expenditures. However, in this paper we take into account the 
different R&D structure between the two groups by considering only if a firm is involved, or 
not, in a specific R&D activities. In this way, we are able to control for the major expenditures 
on technological variables due to the treatment. 
Table 5: Summary Statistics by Treatment-R&D Variables (2005) 
  Treatment Mean Difference in Means 
Personnel Cost R&D 
1 462.069 239.887 
0 222.182 [0.083] 
Total R&D extramuros Expenditure 
1 64.966 33.875 
0 31.091 [0.398] 
Total R&D intramuros Expenditure 
1 611.862 283.953 
0 327.909 [0.114] 
Total Current Expenditure 
1 563.517 287.790 
0 275.727 [0.072] 
Legend: Values are expressed in terms of Thousand of Euro. ''Difference in Means'' reports the difference between 
the average of control and treatment group, while p-values are in square bracket.  
 
In the next section we present the ”standard” DID and our ”novel” approach that, considering 
the geographical localization, allows for differentiated effects on the basis of firms 
concentration. 
 
3 Methods 
In this paper we evaluate the additionality of regional policies by a “counterfactual” approach. 
The limited number of observation and the temporal discontinuity across the period 2004 and 
2011 in available data6, i.e. unbalanced panel, makes preferable an estimation procedure based 
on a Diff-in-Diff method7, i.e. the impact of a policy is computed using a “double difference”, 
in time (pre-post treatment) and between subjects (treated and control). However, the validity 
of this approach requires un-testable assumptions. Indeed, the results of methodologies based 
on single difference are characterized by the “selection bias”, while if what differentiates treated 
and controls does not change over time, the Diff-in-Diff eliminates the selection bias and 
produces correct estimates of the policies effects. In other words, the un-testable assumption in 
DID approach is that the differences between the groups are constant over time; thus, without 
treatment, there would not be differences in behaviour between the groups.  
 
6 Temporal discontinuity on available data is attenuated by considering the years 2005 (pre-treatment) and 2010 
(post-treatment). 
7 Detailed information on the difference in difference approach and its development can be found in: Ashenfelter 
and Card, 1984; Abadie, 2005; Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan, 2004; Donald and Lang, 2007; Athey and 
Imbens, 2006; Puhani, 2012; Mora and Reggio 2012. 
To implement the DID approach we estimate equations of the type: 
(1) 𝑦 = 𝛽$ + 𝛽&𝑇 + 𝛽(𝑃 + 𝛽*𝑇 ∗ 𝑃 + 𝜀 
where y denotes the outcome of interest, T and P are dummy variables equal, respectively, to 1 
for the treated units and for the post-treatment period. Under the SUTVA assumption we can 
estimate the Average Treatment Effect (ATE):  
(2) 𝐴𝑇𝐸 = {𝐸[𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 1] − 	𝐸[𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 0]} − {𝐸[𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 1] − 𝐸[𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 0]} 
 The analysis focuses on a 5-years period, where P=0 refers to 2005 and P=1 to 2010. This 
choice is optimal since most of the instruments provided by the region has been delivered in 
2007. In this way we can correctly define both pre and post treatment periods. A relevant issue 
related to the evaluation of the effects of R&D subsidies consists in the diffusion of 
technological spillovers, i.e. potential benefits which may arise also for non-treated units due 
to the combined action of the policies, business location and economic sector. The identification 
of the spillover effects, however, requires a partially relaxed version of the SUTVA (Stable 
Unit Treatment Value Assumption) hypothesis. 
Indeed, evaluation strategies based on the SUTVA rely on the assumption that the response of 
a particular unit depends only on its assigned treatment, and not on the treatments received by 
the others, i.e. absence of interferences between units (Rubin 1974). However, there are 
circumstances in which invoke the validity of the SUTVA could not be plausible. For instance, 
considering two firms located in the same area and part of the same competitive market and 
assuming that only one of them receives public incentives, the benefits of the subsidized one 
can be shared, indirectly, even by the other (i.e. the untreated one). 
Recently an increasing number of studies focuses on the cases in which the assumptions at the 
basis of the SUTVA are violated in order to find a methodological approach that includes the 
presence of interactions between units8. Research on drawing inference on causal effects in 
 
8 Manski (1993) explains how the impossibility to distinguish between endogenous and contextual interactions 
and the possible presence of correlated effects reveals the so-called “Reflection Problem”. The author refers to 
endogenous effect as the contemporaneous and reciprocal influences of peers, meanwhile the contextual effect 
includes measures of peers unaffected by current behaviour. The identification problem arises because mean 
behaviour in the group is itself determined by the conduct of group members. Possible approach in order to take 
into account the identification problem includes the restrictions on the shape of the response function (Manski 
2013), estimation of structural interaction effects by means of a spatial autoregressive model (Lee 2006), binary 
treatment model with “endogenous” neighbourhood effects (Cerulli 2015). 
presence of interferences is not yet common, although some exceptions exist (Verbitsky and 
Raudenbush 2004; Sobel 2006; Rosenbaum 2007; Tchetgen and VanderWeele 2012; Hudgens 
and Halloran 2012; Kao et al. 2012; Sinclair, McConnell, and Green 2012; De Castris and 
Pellegrini 2015; Di Gennaro and Pellegrini, 2017; Giua 2017; Cerqua and Pellegrini, 2017; 
Fiaschi et al. 2018)9. 
However, most of the existing works are theoretical, focalized on randomized experiments or 
based on the combination of spatial and counterfactual models. In this paper we develop an 
approach similar to the one proposed by Cerqua and Pellegrini (2017). The authors propose a 
partially relaxed version of the SUTVA that take into account the interactions between the 
untreated firms; they distinguish non-recipient firms considering their exposition to the 
subsidized ones and evaluate the spillover effects by a comparison between the affected ones 
and the others. The peculiarity of our approach is to assume the validity of the SUTVA only 
outside “best-performing” regional LMAs, i.e. Perugia and Terni, in relation to their 
geographical localization10; while we allow the presence of interactions within the groups. As 
previously explained, the identification of major LMAs relies on demographic, economic and 
labour market concentration. 
Therefore, our assumption imposes the restriction that interferences between subsidized and not 
subsidized firms are relevant only inside the LMA and not significant outside. In other words, 
we are assuming that technological spillovers due to regional policies depends from the 
presence of spatial agglomeration of economic activities (Andersson et al, 2016). The 
interferences are introduced in our empirical framework through an additional dummy variable 
(LMA), which represent Perugia and Terni LMA, and the interaction term with treatment and 
temporal variables. 
  
 
9 New advancements in the field of causal inference using the DID approach in a spatial context are: Delgado and 
Florax (2015), Chagas et al. (2016) and Di Gennaro and Pellegrini (2016) 
10 Rosenbaum (2007) remarks how the interference can be expressed as a function of proximity between units. 
Appropriate measure of proximity can be: geographical distance, nodal distance in a known social network, metrics 
of social or economic distance. Nevertheless, we focus only on the geographical dimension of the interferences 
between units, many are the studies that consider alternative measures of proximity on the identification of causal 
effects. Brock and Durlauf (2007), Cerulli (2015) and Arduini, Patacchini, and Rainone (2014) focus on social 
interferences, meanwhile Arpino, Mattei, and others (2013) model interferences as a function of firms size and 
geographical distances. 
This framework allows to estimate two specific causal effects: 
Average Treatment Effect using the Influenced Controls (ATEIC): 
(3) 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐼𝐶 = {𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 1, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 0, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1)} −{𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 1, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 0, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1)} 
Average Treatment Effect using the Uninfluenced Control (ATEUC):  
(4) 𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑈𝐶 = {𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 1, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 1, 𝑃1 = 0, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 1)} −{𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 1, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 0) − 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑇1 = 0, 𝑃1 = 0, 𝐿𝑀𝐴 = 0)} 
ATEIC and the ATEUC allow for diversified impacts, depending on the choice of the controls. 
ATEUC, considering control units in smaller regional LMAs, gives us the impact of the 
subsidies, while the ATEIC, calculated on Perugia and Terni non-subsidized firms, is a measure 
of the error in the estimation of the effects when we assume wrongly the validity of the SUTVA. 
This intuition is a consequence on the restriction of interferences. Indeed, assuming the 
relevance of interferences only inside Perugia and Terni allows to identify the spillover effects 
as the difference between ATEIC, i.e. the effect in presence of interferences, and ATEUC, i.e. 
treatment effect when interferences are not considered11. 
While control units are differentiated if they are located or not in greater regional LMAs, in 
estimating ATEIC and ATEUC we consider only treated firms in Perugia and Terni areas12. In 
doing so, we implicitly assume the occurrence of unidirectional technological spillovers which 
may arise from Perugia and Terni LMAs to other areas, and not vice versa.  
4 Results 
In this section we provide evidence on the effectiveness of public policies in Umbria, analysing 
the presence of technological spillovers due to the conjunct action of regional aid and market 
concentration. This operation requires the empirical evaluation of the three distinct treatment 
effects (ATE, ATEIC, ATEUC) presented in the previous section. Following the suggestion in 
 
11 However, the method we use does not allow to estimate properly the intensity of these effects. Indeed, we have 
not imposed restrictions on the sample of influenced and not influenced firms. In other words, we do not match 
directly these two groups of firms, and therefore we are not completely sure that the difference between the ATEIC 
and ATEUC is not marginally affected by differences in the characteristics of influenced and not influenced firms. 
12 ATE estimate considers the entire treated and control group, independently from the location or not in Perugia 
and Terni LMAs. 
Neumark and Simpson (2015) to better understand overall effects of the policies we extend our 
analysis to a wider range of outcomes, i.e. policies targeted to innovation and R&D processes 
may have an impact not only on technological variables, but also on profitability and firm’s 
workforce. In doing so, Table 6 shows the results for technological and economic variables13. 
The estimates demonstrate the presence of additional effects for innovation and technological 
processes, but scarce results on economic performances. Firstly, we assume the validity of the 
SUTVA, considering the effects using the ATE on all LMAs. The results indicate a major 
propensity to R&D process for the treated, both for internal and external research. This higher 
propensity is confirmed by the positive and significant impact of the policies on patents, 
innovation of product and production process, the development of better logistic systems and 
the acquisition of machinery, equipment and software. Furthermore, treated firms demonstrate 
a greater propensity to operate in international markets, in contra-position of a regional 
tendency of the controls.  
The international openness of the subsidized firms highlights the improvement of their relative 
competitiveness in regional market, making it more dynamic and global. Instead, the limited 
impact on firms’ performance is in line with Italian literature (Bronzini and Piselli, 2016; 
Corsino et al.,2012). ATEIC results, i.e. when SUTVA is not valid, are similar in size and 
statistical significance. The comparison between the ATEIC and ATEUC allows to identify the 
direction of technological and economic spillovers on the treated firms due to regional policies 
and market concentration (column ATEIC-ATEUC). However, given the method we have used 
for the estimation, we cannot exactly quantify the dimension and test its statistical 
significance.14 
  
 
13A description of Innovation and Technological variables is in Appendix. Performance Variables are defined 
following the traditional definition in balance sheet and are expressed in Euro. 
14 This analysis would have required a statistical matching among treated and not treated for each LMAs, that 
was not possible given the limited size of the control sample. 
Table 6: Results 
Input Variables at Innovation and R&D 
  ATE ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC-ATEUC 
Employes R&D 1.43  3.48  0.05  3.43 
R&D intramuros (%) 36.56*** 46.62 ***  31.29 ***  15.33 
R&D extramuros (%) 45.68*** 48.65 ***  54.87 ***  -6.22 
Machine,equipment,software(%) 20.69 ***  21.82**  13.35  8.47 
Output Variables at Innovation and R&D 
  ATE ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC-ATEUC 
Product (%) 26.31 ***  29.87 ***  24.07 ***  5.8 
Service (%) 2.59  9.58  -3.7  13.28 
Production Process (%) 22.47 ***  30.68 ***  17.18  13.5 
Logistic System (%) 16.16**  14.44  25.42*  -10.98 
Patent (%) 25.66 ***  25.85**  28.36**  -2.51 
Protection design and model (%) 8.28  9.82  13.26  -3.44 
Regional Market Share (%) -16.98 ***  -12.55  -17.1*  4.55 
National Market Share (%) 5.88  1.47  6.77  -5.3 
EU Market Share (%) 2.38  3.45  5.69  -2.24 
Non-EU Market Share (%) 9.36 ***  8.86 ***  7.09*  1.77 
Performance Variables 
  ATE ATEIC ATEUC ATEIC-ATEUC 
Output Value -1660703  -3036829  -1033338  -2003491 
Personnel Costs -119255  -118806  -523622 ***  404816 
Amortization 215765 ***  287742**  188119  99623 
Added Value 117942  88808  -183487  272295 
Ebitda 237197  207614  340135*  -132521 
Ebit 81873  -3083  155234  -158317 
ROI 0.34  -0.98  -1.27  0.29 
Legend: Diff-in-Diff estimates refers to the period 2005-2010. Column ATEIC-ATEUC is built by differencing 
ATEIC-ATEUC. For ATE, ATEIC and ATEUC: *** 99 %, ** 95 %, * 90 %  
This comparison evidences some interesting differences on technological processes between 
influenced and uninfluenced units15. When the difference between ATEIC and ATEUC is 
positive (negative) we provide evidences in favour of the occurrence of negative (positive) 
spillover effects on influenced firms. Results show that firm concentration plays a determinant 
role in the choice between internal and external research; influenced firms tend to develop 
external research (for instance, using the subsidized firms), while the uninfluenced units 
highlights a greater propensity on internal research.  
 
15Remark that the differences between this two samples depend on the geographical localization of the units. With 
the term "influenced" we indicate the unsubsidized located in Perugia and Terni LMAs, while the "uninfluenced" 
are the controls in the other LMAs. 
A second insight regards the differentiated output of R&D activities for influenced and not 
influenced. Control units in major LMAs are less involved in product and production process 
innovations. Conversely, uninfluenced firms show a lower attitude on improving their logistic 
systems. The third consideration regards the presence of a negative and significant effect on 
personnel costs for the controls located outside the influence areas of the treated. Recombining 
the results of the estimates in a unique framework, we can identify some interesting 
characteristics on the dissimilarities on technological process between firms located inside and 
outside the influence area of the treated. 
Summarising, the influenced controls tend to externalize their research activity, with a small 
reduction on the number of employees to R&D. The lack of internal activity is reflected in a 
lower propensity to product and process innovation and the improvement in their logistic 
systems to improve the connection with other economical agents, i.e. firms, research centre and 
universities, involved in joint innovation activities. The unifluenced, taking into account also 
the less concentrated market in which they operate, improve their capital assets (i.e. positive 
effect on the acquisition of equipment and machinery) to implement internal R&D activities 
and develop independently their innovative products, with a number of firms which improves 
their production processes and services materials higher in comparison with the uninfluenced 
ones. This is confirmed by larger R&D personnel expenses, symptomatic of an higher 
requirement of qualified and expensive human capital. In conclusion, we can gather that the 
uninfluenced tend to create and develop some forms of research network in order to counteract 
their involvement in a less concentrated market. 
Results by Group 
The results presented in the previous section highlight the presence of some technological 
spillovers. However, the peculiarities of the regional productive structure require an in-depth 
analysis. RUICS (2009) indicates the lack of large firms as one of the main structural problem 
in the region, highlighting a reduced average size of the regional enterprises. Additional 
estimates limited only to the sample of small firms are therefore useful. Furthermore, following 
Dechezleprêtre et al (2016), which demonstrate the relevance of sectoral distance in evaluating 
spillover effects, we present results limited to manufacturing sector.  
Small firms estimates highlight a higher additional impact of regional policies. Treated firms 
demonstrate a lower propensity to operate on regional market, while they are more involved in 
both internal and external research. The effects on economic variables are still limited, even if 
the impact on net assets is positive and significant. Moreover, the results provide evidence in 
favour of the occurrence of spillover effects. The most significant effect is related to the 
expenditure components. The wide ATEUC reflects the fact that small firms located outside 
the main LMAs invest less than the influenced controls, especially in external research 
activities. Interestingly, being part of joint research activities improves substantially the 
innovative output for influenced units, i.e. negative spillover effects on R&D output. 
Conversely, the estimates suggest the preference for the uninfluenced to implement internal 
research.  
Table 7: Results by group 
       Small Firms Manufacturing 
Input Variables at innovation and R&D 
  ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC 
Employees R&D 6.07 4.32 1.75 -0.21 -4.53 4.32 
R&D intramuros (%) 53.38***  35.33***  18.05 39***  20.82*  18.18 
R&D extramuros (%) 54.73***  59.51***  -4.78 34.6 **  52.79***  -18.19 
Total research expenditures -49.97 119.54 **  -169.51 189 -385.54 574.54 
Output Variables at innovation and R&D 
  ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC 
Product (%) 32.37***  33.48***  -1.11 14.37 5.28 9.09 
Service (%) -2.17 -8.42 6.25 15.84 11.29 4.55 
Production Process (%) 30**  18.89 **  11.11 43.64***  16.36 27.28 
Logistic System (%) 20 26.94* -6.94 27.88*  36.97**  -9.09 
Patent (%) 26.81**  30.98 **  -4.17 20.53 29.62*  -9.09 
Protection design and model(%) 8.45 13.32 -4.87 7.04 7.04 0 
Regional Market Share (%) -14.72*  -22.18 **  7.46 -1.25 1.38 -2.63 
National Market Share (%) 3.68 11.77 -8.09 -2.95 0.55 -3.5 
EU Market Share (%) 4.7 5.31 -0.61 -3.31 -3.03 -0.28 
Non-EU Market Share (%) 8.03 **  6.31*  1.72 9.51*  6.05 3.46 
Performance Variables 
  ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC ATEIC ATEUC 
ATEIC-
ATEUC 
Output Value -101256 -366314 -2003491 1757665 -1193062 2950727 
Personnel Costs -78578 -53972 404816 95516 -703631**  799147 
Amortization 70674*  88316**  99623 387028*  204118 182910 
Added Value -45215 -37722 272295 160838 -193869 354707 
Ebitda 33363 16250 -132521 65322 509762*  -444440 
Ebit -37431 -132708 -158317 -108669 332410 -441079 
ROI -0.93 -1.6 0.29 -2.32 -1.24  -1.08 
Legend: *** 99 % Significativity, ** 95 % Significativity, * 90 % Significativity. 
Note: Diff-in-Diff estimates refers to the period 2005-2010. ''Small firms'' includes only the enterprises with a 
number of employees between 10 and 49. The definition of manufacturing sector follows the ATECO 2007 
classification (Nace rev.2). Column ATEIC-ATEUC is built by differencing ATEIC-ATEUC. 
 Analysing manufacturing16 sector, we provide weak evidence in favour of the development of 
spillover effects on technological process, limited to negative impacts on production process 
and positive effects on the development of new logistic system, i.e. output to enhance external 
research, and the number of firms which register at least one patent. In overall, the estimates on 
the manufacturing highlight how the uninfluenced controls present better technological and 
financial performances if compared with the influenced untreated, highlighting the occurrence 
of negative externalities due to the localization in a more concentrated market. 
5 Robustness check 
A correct implementation of the DID approach relies on the validity of the “common” trend 
assumption; i.e. the trend in the outcome variable for both treatment and control groups during 
pre-treatment period does not differ. Thus, in absence of treatment, there would not be 
differences in behaviour between the two groups and the deviation on temporal trend after the 
treatment identifies the treatment effects. This assumption plays a fundamental role in the 
implementation of the Difference in Difference estimators. To test the validity of the common 
trend assumption we evaluate if the growth rate for treated and controls outcomes follows 
parallel paths during the pre-treatment period. 
Table 8: Robustness Check 
             ATE   ATEIC  ATEUC  
Equity  0.3 0.05 -0.01 
Net assets  0.05 0.06 13.67 
Net income  -17.78 -41.81 -45.22 
Output Value  1.07 0.18 0.36 
Personnel Costs  6.81 13.67 13.61 
Amortization  -30.76 0.1 -12.04 
Added Value  4.67 8.13 12.01 
Ebitda  18.95 6.88 6.95 
Ebit   16.82 35.95 36.46 
ROI   3.63 7.63 6.59 
Note: The reported statistics are expressed in terms of growth rate between 2004 and 2005.  
 
16 The definition of manufacturing are based on the Italian classification of the economic activity (ATECO 2007). 
ATECO 2007 recalls the European definition and guidelines indicated in the NACE rev.2; in this way the data are 
comparable both at EU and extra-EU level. In detail, Manufacturing corresponds to the entire Section C of the 
classifications. 
 Table 8 shows the absence of significant differences in the economic performances for all the 
outcome variables used in the estimation of the ATE, ATEIC and the ATEUC during pre-
treatment period. The lack of systematic differences in the temporal trend between treated and 
controls confirms the validity of the “common trend” assumption and, by consequence, of the 
results presented in this paper. 
6 Conclusions 
Modern economic theory places a strong emphasis on the role of innovation and technical 
change in generating growth. In this paper we provide evidence on the effectiveness of R&D 
regional policies in Umbria. Starting from a “traditional” counterfactual approach, we introduce 
the possibility of interactions between firms, on the basis of their geographical localization and 
market concentration. Modelling interferences in a casual framework, rules out the validity of 
the SUTVA and makes impossible the identification of casual effects (Manski, 1993, 2013). To 
overcome this limitation, literature proposes a series of different possible approaches, including 
spatial model (Florax and Delgado, 2016; Chagas et al., 2016), spatial hierarchical approach 
(Corrado and Fingleton, 2012; Di Gennaro and Pellegrini, 2017), network (Forastiere et al, 
2016) and mediation analysis (Deuchert et al., 2018). Overall, a common point of these different 
approaches is to impose restriction on the extension and the typology of interactions which may 
arise between different units to make identifiable causal effects and estimate the spillovers. 
Conversely, we propose a less stringent restriction on interferences. This choice has a twofold 
impact on our estimates. On one hand, it allows to differentiate the effects in consideration of 
territorial strength and identify the occurrence of technological and economic spillovers. In 
other words, we partially relax the SUTVA by limiting interferences on more concentrated 
regional local areas and, in second instance, we compare results obtained with the estimates of 
the areas in which interactions are ruled out. On the other hand, without posing further 
restriction on the interactions between units, we cannot correctly quantify the real extension of 
the spillovers.  
Results provide evidence in favour of the effectiveness of regional policies. The subsidies have 
additional and significant effects on the improvement of technological capabilities, both in 
terms of input and output of the R&D processes, while there are no impacts on firms’ 
performances.  
The lack of short-term effects on the economic variables can be explained, at least partially, by 
regional policies objectives, i.e. foster research and innovation of the firms. This produces a 
change in firms’ behaviour which stimulate technological production and R&D process. In this 
way, seems reasonable to expect a longer temporal lag between the production of the innovation 
and economic benefits on the activities of the firms. However, the limited temporal extension 
of our data does not allow now to evaluate medium and long period effects17. 
Moreover, the impact is heterogeneous across firms. Indeed, we have found some empirical 
evidence on the different structure of the process of innovation; the uninfluenced firms acquire 
machine and equipment to develop internal research finalized to product and production process 
innovation. Conversely, the influenced ones prefer to implement external, i.e. joint, research, 
increasing their link with the other economic agents in the same area. 
The effectiveness of public policies is not only influenced by geographical location. As 
expected, also firms’ size is important. Small firms present a larger additional impact, both in 
terms of policy effectiveness and for the technological spillovers. The more evident results are 
found considering the development of negative spillover effects for R&D expenditures. Indeed, 
the uninfluenced controls tend to spend more for technological input variables, both for 
personnel and research costs, while estimates for the manufacturing show the presence of 
different technological paths compared with the previous cases. Indeed, the limited effects on 
product innovation are counterbalanced by the significant impact on the development of new 
production process and the acquisition of machinery and equipment. Besides, it is important to 
remark the development of negative externalities. This shows how the process innovation, in 
this sector, is affected by market concentration and does not necessarily imply the development 
of research network.  
In conclusion the results seem to confirm empirically strict local links and the presence of 
significant local technological and economic, positive or negative, spillovers as a response of 
the conjunct influence of the regional policies and the geographical concentration. This concept 
constitutes the “core” of the smart specialization policies in Europe and our novel approach can 
 
17 This will be the object of a future analysis 
be considered a powerful tool in order to provide evidence on the presence of technological and 
economic spillovers in the same area. 
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7 APPENDIX 
List of Variables 
 
Input Variables at innovation and R&D 
 
Employees R&D: Number of workers operating in R&D activities   
R&D intramuros: Percentage of firms which implement internal R&D activities.  
R&D extramuros: Percentage of firms involved in external R&D activities, i.e. joint R&D 
projects with other firms, research centre or universities.   
Total research expenditures: Total expenses for R&D activities (both intra and extramuros, in 
Euro).  
Machine,equipment,software: Percentage of firms which acquire machine, equipment and/or 
software. 
 
Output Variables at innovation and R&D 
 
Product: Percentage of firms which provide product innovation.  
Service: Percentage of firms which provide service innovation.  
Production Process: Percentage of firms which provide innovation on production process 
Logistic System: Percentage of firms which provide innovation on logistic system.  
Patent: Percentage of firms which register at least a patent.  
Copyright: Percentage of firms which implement actions of copyright. 
Regional Market Share: Share of firms’ activities in regional market.  
National Market Share: Share of firms’ activities in national market.  
EU Market Share: Share of firms’ activities in EU market.  
Non-EU Market Share: Share of firms’ activities in Non-EU market.  
